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Abstract: We examine the evolutionary foundations of intertemporal preferences. When
all the risk aecting survival and reproduction is idiosyncratic, evolution selects for agents
who maximize the discounted sum of expected utility, discounting at the sum of the
population growth rate and the mortality rate. Aggregate uncertainty concerning survival
rates leads to discount rates that exceed the sum of population growth rate and death
rate, and can push agents away from exponential discounting.
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nancial support.How much do people discount the future? How does their discounting change as
they consider events further in the future?1 Perhaps more fundamentally, why do people
discount at all?
Irving Fisher's (1930, pp. 84{85) pioneering study of intertemporal trade-os called
attention to one reason future rewards are discounted|an intervening death may prevent
us from realizing such rewards. The possibility of death has played a recurring role in
discussions of discounting (e.g., Menahem E. Yaari (1965)). Ingemar Hansson and Charles
Stuart (1990) and Alan R. Rogers (1994) argue that evolution should select in favor of
people whose discounting re
ects the growth rate of the population with whom they are
competing (see also Arthur J. Robson and Balazs Szentes (2007)). Putting these ideas
together leads to models in which people discount at the sum of the population growth
rate and the mortality rate.
One diculty with this argument is that the numbers don't obviously match. Studies
of contemporary rates of time preference have produced estimates as high as twelve to
twenty percent per year (Emily C. Lawrance (1991)). Stean Andersen, Glenn W. Har-
rison, Morton I. Lau and E. Elisabet Rutstr om (2008, Table III), arguing that estimated
discount rates fall when correcting for the confounding eects of risk aversion, nd (still
surprisingly high) discount rates of about ten percent . In contrast, Michael Gurven and
Hillard Kaplan (2007, pp. 330-331) use data from contemporary hunter-gatherers to esti-
mate that annual mortality rates during our evolutionary history ranged from one percent
for ten-year-olds to four percent for sixty-year-olds, while the average population growth
rate over this two-million year period must have been approximately zero, suggesting dis-
count rates of a few percent. A second issue is the growing evidence that intertemporal
preferences exhibit a present bias not captured by the exponential discounting of standard
models.
This paper re-examines the foundations of intertemporal preferences. Like Hans-
son and Stuart (1990) and Rogers (1994), we view peoples' preferences as having been
1Recent policy discussions, especially those regarding global warming, have focussed attention on the
rst question (e.g., William Nordhaus (2007)), while recent work in behavioral economics has directed
attention to the latter (Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue (2002)).
2shaped by biological evolution. We consider the evolution of intertemporal preferences
in age-structured populations, i.e., populations in which each individual can reproduce
at dierent ages, focussing on the simplest question of how people discount future repro-
duction. When all the risk aecting survival and reproduction is idiosyncratic, we nd
the standard result that there is a close connection between the evolutionary criterion
for success and the simplest criterion for intertemporal choice|the discounted sum of
expected utility. This result involves the anticipated rate of discount, namely the sum of
the population growth rate and the mortality rate.
Our contribution derives from the observation that the risks in our evolutionary en-
vironment are unlikely to have been purely idiosyncratic. Fluctuations in the weather or
abundance of predators, epidemics, and failures of food sources are all bound to have a
common eect on death rates. Such aggregate uncertainty breaks the connection between
discounting and the sum of the growth and death rates. We rst show that aggregate
uncertainty \generically" lowers the growth rate below that arising with comparable id-
iosyncratic uncertainty.2 Furthermore, if the environmental 
uctuations have a uniform
eect on people of dierent ages, then future reproduction is discounted at a rate exceed-
ing the population growth rate plus the mortality rate corresponding to mean survival|so
that aggregate risk may lie behind the apparent gap between discount rates and growth
and mortality rates.3
What if the eects of aggregate uncertainty dier across ages? We nd that discount
rates need no longer be constant, and we present natural (but by no means universal)
conditions under which the rate of discount falls as a function of age. This \present
bias" in discounting is reminiscent of the present bias that has played a central role in
behavioral economics. However, the discount rates that emerge from our model are tied
to age rather than time, precluding preference reversals.4
2See Robson (1996) for an analogous result for populations without an age structure.
3Section 2.4 explains how this model formalizes and generalizes the \sawtooth" explanation sometimes
advanced to reconcile an average growth rate near zero in our evolutionary past with the higher growth
rates often seen in contemporary hunter-gatherers. This sawtooth model couples periods of sustained
growth with rare, rapid and evolutionarily-neutral population collapses.
4Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin (2005) and Peter D. Sozou (1998) also present evolutionary foun-
3Section 1 introduces the mechanics of age-structured populations for the simpler
case of an environment with only idiosyncratic uncertainty. Section 2 examines aggregate
uncertainty. Section 3 discusses some of the features that are left out of our analysis.
Proofs not contained in the body of the paper are collected in Section 4.
1 Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
It is helpful to rst consider the more straightforward case of idiosyncratic uncertainty,
drawing on Brian Charlesworth (1994) and Alasdair I. Houston and John M. McNamara
(1999), and following Robson and Larry Samuelson (2007).
1.1 The model
Time is discrete, given by t = 0;1;:::. We take a census of a population at the start of
each period t, letting N(t) be the number of agents then of age  2 f1;2;:::;Tg.
The rst event in period t is that each agent of age  2 f1;2;:::;Tg has ospring,
with x denoting the expected number of ospring born to an age- parent. Each agent of
each age  2 f0;:::;T  1g then either dies or survives, with S the probability of survival.
Agents of age T disappear from our system. This may re
ect either death or a continuing
life without reproduction, essentially equivalent fates from a biological point of view.5 All
surviving agents younger than T enter the next period one year older. This brings us to
the beginning of period t + 1, where we take the next census, nding N(t + 1) agents of
age  2 f1;2;:::;Tg, and begin the process anew with the next round of births.
The assumption that survival rates are constant across ages looks restrictive. How-
ever, because we place no restrictions on the pattern of fertility, the constant-survival-rate
assumption is innocuous. In particular, all of the evolutionarily relevant information is
dations for presently-biased preferences, including in Dasgupta and Maskin's case the possibility of pref-
erence reversals. We discuss these papers in Section 3.
5Continued life without reproduction scales up the population but does not aect its growth rate. A
mutation that increased one of fx1;:::;xTg by even a very small amount, while sacricing all survival
beyond age T, would increase the growth rate and hence would be evolutionarily favored.
4contained in the agent's expected number of ospring at each age, where this expecta-
tion includes the probability that an intervening death may x the realized number of
ospring at zero. Given an arbitrary specication of age-dependent survival rates and
expected ospring conditional on survival, we can nd a formally equivalent description
in which survival rates are constant across ages and fertilities are adjusted accordingly to
preserve the expected number of ospring at each age, allowing us to apply the techniques
described below. Section 3 further discusses the implications of this equivalence in a more
general setting. In the meantime, taking death rates to be constant allows us to isolate
other factors that may lie behind varying discount rates.
Depending on the magnitude of the survival rate S, the population may be exploding
or shrinking to zero. None of the subsequent analysis would be aected if there were an
environmental carrying capacity that would eventually cap the size of the population, as
long as our S is then interpreted as the endogenously determined zero-population-growth
steady-state survival rate.
We are ultimately interested in people's preferences over the wide variety of things
they consume, rather than simply reproduction. We view our study of intertemporal
preferences over reproduction as a necessary rst step in studying preferences over con-
sumption. Reproduction is the currency of evolution, with the various features of our
preferences having survived the evolutionary screen because of their salutary eects on
reproduction. We thus cannot understand the evolutionary implications of other intertem-
poral trade-os without understanding trade-os over reproduction. To make the link to
preferences over consumption, we would view the fertility x as being a function of the
consumption of food, shelter, status, and a host of other economic goods, with intertem-
poral preferences over these goods induced by their implications for x. We do not assert
that people explicitly consider the reproductive implications of each decision they make.
Evolution has instead doubtlessly found it more expedient to simply endow us with pref-
erences over economic goods, but these preferences are shaped by the implications of the
resulting decisions for reproduction.6
6To be more precise, if fertility x were a function f of consumption at date , then attitudes to
intertemporal inequality in consumption would be aected by the properties of f (its concavity, for
5The intertemporal trade-os examined in our model explicitly concern the timing of
reproduction within an agent's lifetime. Intertemporal trade-os often involve intergen-
erational allocations.7 Our model can be applied to examine such transfers: We can view
the reproductive proles (x1;:::;xT) appearing in our analysis as the product of both
consumption and intergenerational transfer decisions, so that our results would provide
insight into preferences over transfers as well as consumption once the appropriate links
between consumption and reproduction are made.
We also recognize that our modern environment is quite dierent from that in which
we evolved. However, precisely because evolution found it more expedient to simply
give us preferences over economic goods rather than make us relentless reproduction
calculators, insight into the preferences that shape behavior in our modern world is to be
found by examining our evolutionary past.
1.2 Evolution
An agent in this environment is characterized by its reproduction prole fx; 2 f1;2;:::;Tgg.
This prole is heritable|each agent's reproductive prole matches that of their parent.
Notice that we have abstracted away from a number of realistic considerations. Repro-
duction is asexual in this model, there are no errors or distortions in the process of genetic
transmission, all the agents apparently do is live and reproduce, there is no explicit trade-
o between the quantity and quality of ospring, and so on. This allows us to focus on
the basic determinants of time preferences.
We now ask which reproductive proles will be selected by evolution. In particular,
suppose a population initially contains a variety of reproductive proles. Some agents
may have ospring in many dierent periods, some in only a single period. Some may
example) as well as the way in which the x combined to yield population growth. Since the rst eect
is relatively familiar, we concentrate here on the derivation of the growth rate criterion from the x.
Extending the analysis from reproduction to consumption is relatively straightforward if reproduction at
age  is a function of consumption at age  (only), and becomes more complicated as we move away from
this simple case (cf. Robson, Szentes and Emil Iantchev (2005)).
7Work on intergenerational transfers includes Rogers (1994).
6have ospring early but have only a few, others may wait longer to reproduce but then
have more ospring. Among these reproductive proles, some will tend to generate more
ultimate descendants than others, and if we examine the population after natural selec-
tion has had ample time to work, it will be composed almost entirely of agents bearing
this descendant-maximizing reproductive prole. Subsequent mutations introducing re-
productive proles leading to fewer ultimate descendants will die out relatively quickly.
In making this idea precise, we follow the standard approach in assuming the number
of agents following each reproductive prole is large, captured formally by viewing the set
of agents as a continuum. This allows us to construct a convenient deterministic model
of the population. Each agent faces idiosyncratic uncertainty, in the sense that the agent
may have more or fewer ospring in a given period and may or may not survive until the
next, but the average number of ospring born to all agents of age  (with reproductive
prole fx; 2 f1;2;:::;Tgg) can be taken to be precisely x and the proportion of
survivors can be taken to be precisely S.8
The population of agents characterized by reproductive prole fx; 2 f1;2;:::;Tgg
8Intuitively, each agent of age  takes an independent (across agents and across periods) draw from
an ospring lottery with mean x, determining the agent's number of ospring, and a draw from a
survival lottery that yields survival with probability S and death with probability 1   S. The law of
large numbers then ensures that average and expected numbers of total ospring, as well as average and
expected numbers of total surviving agents, coincide. More precisely, it is well known that one cannot
appeal to such a law-of-large-numbers result with a continuum of random variables (cf. Nabil Ibraheem
Al-Najjar (1995)). In our case, as in many applications, independence is not necessary, allowing one to
construct explicit probability spaces yielding random variables with the properties that are important for
our results.
7thus evolves according to
[N1(t + 1);:::;NT(t + 1)] = [N1(t);:::;NT(t)]
2
6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6
4
Sx1 S 0 ::: 0





SxT 1 0 0 ::: S
SxT 0 0 ::: 0
3
7 7 7 7





where 0 denotes transpose. Each row of the matrix X describes the fate of one of the
age cohorts in the population. The second row, for example, tells us that each two-
period-old agent has x2 ospring, which survive with probability S to become period-t+1
one-period-olds, and each current two-period-old survives with probability S to become a
three-period-old. The transition matrix X is the Leslie matrix (P. H. Leslie (1945,1948)).
The number of agents at time t characterized by the reproductive prole giving rise





We can form one such equation for each possible reproductive prole (though we refrain
from introducing such notation). Which reproductive prole will give rise to the most
descendants at some point in the future? This is equivalent to asking which reproductive
prole will give rise to the \largest" Xt for large t. In answering this question, we assume
that the Leslie matrix X is primitive, in that there exists some k > 0 for which Xk is
strictly positive.9 This allows us to bring standard results in matrix theory to bear in
examining Xt.
In particular, the Perron-Frobenius theorem (E. Seneta (1981, Theorem 1.1)) implies
that the Leslie matrix has a \dominant" eigenvalue  that is real, positive, of multiplicity
9A sucient condition for this is that there exist two relatively prime ages  and 0 for which x and x0
are both nonzero. It suces, for example, that  and 0 are adjacent. Note that xT > 0 by assumption,
since otherwise agents of age T would be past reproductive age and removed from our consideration.














where the vectors u and v are the strictly positive left (u0X = u0) and right (Xv = v)
eigenvectors associated with , normalized so that u0v = 1 and
PT
=1 u = 1. Regardless
of the initial condition N0(0), the proportion of the population of each age  approaches
u. The vector u thus describes the limiting age distribution of the population. The vector
v gives the \reproductive value" of an individual of each age, or the relative contribution
that each such individual makes to the long run population.
This result can be more easily interpreted after premultiplying the rst equation by








The expression u0Xtv is referred to as the total reproductive value of the population and
serves as a convenient measure of the period-t population. This result then tells us that
the population growth rate is given by the log of the dominant eigenvalue of the Leslie
matrix. Those reproductive proles whose Leslie matrixes have higher dominant eigenval-
ues will leave more ultimate descendants than others, and eventually the population will
be composed virtually entirely of the reproductive prole that maximizes this eigenvalue.
The eects of natural selection are thus easily characterized|given any set of alterna-
tives, evolution will select the reproductive prole (and only that one) maximizing the
dominant eigenvalue of the corresponding Leslie matrix.10
10The ultimate fate of the population depends on the magnitude of this dominant eigenvalue . The
population grows without bound it  > 1, shrinks if  < 1, and converges to a constant state if  = 1.
A more realistic model would allow the death rate to vary as does the population, increasing as the
population grows in response to increasingly scarce resources and bringing the population to a steady
state. We can capture this possibility in a simple way by reinterpreting the death rate S as the steady-
state death rate.
91.3 Discounted expected utility
We must now turn this characterization of the evolutionary process into a statement about
intertemporal preferences. What does the maximization of an eigenvalue have to do with
the trade-o between x and x0? The eigenvalue  solves the characteristic equation11













Evolution would thus endow an agent with preferences, (or more precisely, would endow an
agent with behavior consistent with preferences) whose indierence curves are described
by the right side of (4), evaluated at the optimal growth rate. That is, a reproduction
prole (x1;:::;xT) giving a higher value for the right side would lead to a higher growth
rate, and the fact that it is not observed indicates that it must be infeasible. A prole
giving a smaller value of the right side of (4) is inferior, leading to a smaller growth rate
that would doom its adherents to dwindle away as a proportion of the population.
This description of preferences is self-referential, since alternatives are ranked accord-
ing to a criterion expressed in terms of the optimal growth rate, which is itself determined
by the optimal alternative. This self-reference is not necessary, serving only to provide a
convenient and familiar description of the preferences for which evolution selects. The evo-
lutionary criterion is clear: a reproductive prole (x1;:::;xT) is better than (^ x1;:::; ^ xT)
if and only if the Leslie matrix associated with the former has a larger dominant eigen-
value. This gives us a complete and unambiguous ranking of reproductive proles, one
that can be checked without reference to the optimal choice. However, there is no explicit
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SxT 1 0 0 ::: S












10functional form capturing this ranking, whereas the growth rate associated with the best
prole gives us an explicit and simple way (in the form of (4)) of describing preferences.
We can move closer to our objective of talking about intertemporal trade-os by





Intuitively, an agent should be willing to forego current ospring only if the return is 
as many ospring next period. Marginal rates of substitution between x+1 and x are
independent of  and independent of the magnitudes of x+1 and x.
Equivalently and perhaps more informatively, we can capture the preferences repre-










The agent thus discounts exponentially at the rate ln, that is, at the sum of the popu-
lation growth rate (ln) and the death rate ( lnS).12 This exponential discounting has
an intuitive interpretation. As one delays a birth, one falls behind the rest of the popu-
lation at rate ln, since one's death occurs at rate  lnS and the rest of the population
is growing at rate ln. The delay must then be compensated by an increment in births
sucient to balance these losses.
The nding that evolution will select for a discount rate equal to the sum of the growth
and death rates echoes a long-standing view to which we alluded in the introduction,
namely that discounting is at least partly motivated by the possibility of an intervening
death. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the resulting discount rate is independent of the
death rate (for a xed fertility prole). An increase in the death rate would simply prompt
a compensating decrease in the population growth rate, leaving their sum, and hence the
discount rate, unchanged. We see this in (5), giving marginal rates of substitution equal
to , which (4) reveals to be determined by the fertility rates (x1;:::;xT) only.
12We can write the survival probability from one period to the next as S = e , where  is the
continuously compounded death rate, and then take logs to express the death rate as  =  lnS.
11In the environment described by this simple model, we would observe only one equi-
librium prole (x1;:::;xT), from which we could infer marginal rates of substitution and
hence discount factors (via (4) and (5)). How might we reconcile the model with the
wide variety of choices we actually see people making? Suppose that newborn agents
are independently (across time and agents) assigned a feasible set XT  <T
+ of possible
reproductive proles from which they must choose.13 Some agents may nd themselves in
more favorable circumstances than others, with correspondingly more favorable prospects
for reproduction. A reproductive strategy would now be not simply a prole (x1;:::;xT),
but rather a vector of such proles, one for each of the possible feasible sets, allowing
evolution to tailor the agent's reproductive prole to the appropriate feasible set. An
agent would be characterized by such a vector of reproduction proles, with this entire
vector being heritable across generations. Each such vector gives rise to an \average"
growth rate , where this average is taken over the collection of feasible sets with which
agents might be faced. Evolution will select for the vector of reproductive proles that
gives the highest average growth rate. We would then observe a potentially vast variety of
behavior, but a straightforward calculation shows that all of the resulting choices would
be consistent with preferences that are again described by (4) (applied to the appropriate
feasible set in each case), with the common value of  now being the average population
growth rate corresponding to the optimal vector of reproductive proles. We could again
infer that marginal rates of substitution are given by (5) and the utility function by (6).
2 Aggregate Uncertainty
We now examine the case of aggregate uncertainty. There are a number of ways such
uncertainty might matter, but we focus on the particularly salient possibility that death
rates may have a common component across individuals. Perhaps a particularly severe
winter or dry summer decreases all survival probabilities, or a good growing season for
food or an epidemic among predators increases them. On top of this, we will then also
13Robson, Szentes and Iantchev (2005)) develop a similar approach.
12allow these aggregate 
uctuations to have varying eects on agents of dierent ages. An
infestation of predators may especially aect younger agents, for example, or an epidemic
may disproportionately aect older agents.
2.1 Why does aggregate uncertainty matter?
Why does it make a dierence whether uncertainty is aggregate or idiosyncratic? It is
helpful here to consider the model of Robson (1996), in which the population has a trivial
age structure. Agents survive from age zero to age one with probability S. At age one
they have x expected ospring and then die. With purely idiosyncratic uncertainty, the
population size N(t) in period t is given by
N(t) = (Sx)N(t   1) = (Sx)
tN(0):
Hence the growth rate is lnSx (and Sx is the dominant eigenvalue  of the trivial Leslie
matrix [Sx]).
Now suppose that instead of a fraction S of the agents surviving from age 0 to age
1, an independent random draw in each period determines whether all agents survive
or all perish, with the probability of survival being S. This shift from idiosyncratic to
aggregate uncertainty leaves expected survival rates untouched but has a profound eect
on the population, whose fate is now eventual extinction with probability one. We have
constructed this example to be particularly simple and to give a particularly striking
result, but it is a quite general result that aggregate uncertainty gives a lower growth rate
(in an unstructured population) than does the equivalent idiosyncratic uncertainty.
2.2 Aggregate uncertainty in age-structured population
Our task now is to extend the model of aggregate uncertainty to age-structured pop-
ulations. Let ~ S be a random variable giving the probability that an agent of age
 2 f0;:::;T   1g survives until the next period, with mean S. Hence, we think of
each agent of age  2 f1;:::;T   1g as rst receiving a common realization ~ S with
support contained in (0;1], identifying the probability that this agent will survive until
13the next period, from a distribution with mean S. The agent then takes an idiosyncratic
draw from a Bernoulli random variable that gives survival with probability ~ S and death
otherwise. Draws of ~ S are independently and identically distributed over time.
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and we continue to let  denote the dominant eigenvalue of this matrix, so that ln is the
population growth rate that would prevail in a population with the same mean behavior
but no aggregate uncertainty. The Leslie matrix in period t is a random variable denoted
by
(8) ~ X(t) =
2
6 6 6 6 6 6
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4
x1 ~ S0(t) ~ S1(t) 0 ::: 0





xT 1 ~ S0(t) 0 0 ::: ~ ST 1(t)
xT ~ S0(t) 0 0 ::: 0
3
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y explores how the the assumption of of a common idiosyncratic death
rate S across ages in (7) can be relaxed, even when there are aggregate shocks to survival
rates.






0 ~ X(1)::: ~ X(t)v;
where u and v are the eigenvectors associated with the mean Leslie matrix X. We can
interpret this as an approximation of the long-run growth rate of total reproductive value,
evaluated with the population proportions u and reproductive values v from the mean
Leslie matrix.14 This is now a product of random matrices. Not only can we not apply the
14There is no diculty using the eigenvectors u and v from the mean Leslie matrix in this approximation
14Perron-Frobenius theorem, but it is no longer obvious that the limit exists. Fortunately,
we have the following remarkable result (rst established by H. Furstenberg and H. Kesten
(1960, Theorem 2) and extended in David Tanny (1981, Theorem 7.1)):15







0 ~ X(1)::: ~ X(t)v = ln:
We refer to ln as the growth rate under aggregate uncertainty.
Natural selection then favors reproductive proles that maximize the growth rate ln.
Once we leave the case of only idiosyncratic uncertainty, it is no longer obvious that we can
restrict attention to pure strategies. Indeed, it is well known that in populations without
an age structure, but with aggregate uncertainty, mixing may be strictly better from an
evolutionary point of view than any pure strategy (e.g., Theodore C. Bergstrom (1997) ,
W. S. Cooper and R. H. Kaplan (2004), Houston and McNamara (1999, Section 10.4) ).16
Similar forces can obviously arise in a population with an age structure. However, mixing
confers no evolutionary advantage, even in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, when
the set of pure strategies is convex and the evolutionary criterion depends only on the
of the growth rate. Proposition 1 below holds for any norm jj ~ X(1)::: ~ X(t)jj. We retain our assumption
that the mean Leslie matrix X is primitive. Together with the restriction that the support of ~ S is
contained in (0;1], this ensures that asymptotically, all elements of ~ X(1)::: ~ X(t) grow at the same nite
rate.
15Taking each ~ S = 1 gives us an upper bound an u0 ~ Xv, ensuring that we satisfy E lnu0 ~ Xv < 1. Our
assumption that ~ S has support contained in (0;1] ensures that E lnu0 ~ Xv >  1, so the more general
sucient condition in Tanny (1981) is satised.
16Consider, for example, agents who can amass either a small or large cache of food for the winter.
Building a large cache carries a higher risk of death at the hands of predators. Winters are typically mild,
with very rare harsh winters. A small cache ensures survival during a mild winter but leads to death in
a harsh winter, while a large cache ensures survival in either case. The pure strategy of always choosing
a small cache leads to extinction at the hands of the rst harsh winter, while always collecting a large
cache leads to ineciently high mortality at the hands of predators. The optimal strategy is to mix,
with most agents choosing a small cache that typically ensures survival at minimal risk, but with a few
choosing large caches to ensure someone survives a harsh winter. Similar examples can be constructed
when strategies are drawn from a continuum.
15(idiosyncratic) number of expected ospring produced at each age, as in our case. That
is, the realized Leslie matrix ~ X(t) in each period t depends only on the realized survival
rates and the reproductive prole (x1;:::;xT). As a result, a population whose members
attached idiosyncratic probability p to reproductive prole (x1;:::;xT) and probability
1 p to prole (x0
1;:::;x0
T) would be indistinguishable from a population whose members
all chose the reproductive prole (px1 + (1   p)x0
1;:::;pxT + (1   p)x0
T). It thus suces
to consider pure strategies.
Aggregate uncertainty builds risk aversion into the evolutionary selection criterion.
We see this in the example of Section 2.1, where it would be worth paying virtually any
price to avoid the possibility of zero ospring.17 Returning to our discussion in Section 1.1,
might intergenerational transfers now be useful as a way of mitigating risk? Transfers that
cannot be conditioned on the aggregate uncertainty add nothing new to the model. In this
case, transfers are again simply tools that might be used in implementing a reproductive
prole (x1;:::;xT), and the implications of such transfers are captured by our analysis of
reproductive proles.
2.3 Aggregate uncertainty slows growth
Our rst result is a generalization to age-structured populations of the nding that ag-
gregate uncertainty slows the population's growth rate.18 Section 4.1 proves:
Proposition 2 Aggregate uncertainty concerning survival reduces the population growth
17This risk is eectively pooled across agents when uncertainty is idiosyncratic, leaving a risk neutral
selection criterion.
18This result depends on the assumption that the idiosyncratic uncertainty is independent across pe-
riods. For example, an environment in which the Leslie matrices X1 and X2 alternate gives a higher



















\Generically," the growth rate is strictly lower under aggregate uncertainty, but for excep-
tional circumstances such as all of the possible realized Leslie matrices having the same
dominant eigenvalue and associated left eigenvector. The following example illustrates
this latter possibility.
Example 1 Suppose there are two equally likely Leslie matrices, X0 and X00, with mean






















In each period, the realized Leslie matrix is independently drawn to be either X0 or X00. The













. The matrices X0 and X00 each
have the same dominant eigenvalue and left eigenvector. For any t, any product of the
form u0X(1)X(2):::X(t)v, where each X(t0) is either X0 or X00, has the same value, xt.
As a result, the growth rate without aggregate uncertainty (i.e., with X(t0) = X for all t0)
matches that with aggregate uncertainty.
2.4 Common survival rates
Perhaps the most natural case to consider is that in which the aggregate shocks aect the
survival rates of all ages equally.
Proposition 3 Let the random variables ~ S0;:::; ~ ST 1 be identical. Then evolution selects








19See Philip A. Curry (2001), J. H. Gillespie (1973), and Houston and McNamara (1999, Chapter 10)
(as well as Robson (1996)) for similar results for the case of T = 1.
17and hence for discounting at the sum ln   lnS of the growth rate and death rate of the
mean Leslie matrix.
As before,  and S are the dominant eigenvalue and survival probability associated with
the mean Leslie matrix (7). Comparing with (5), we thus see that aggregate uncertainty
in death rates has no eect on marginal rates of substitution, and hence discounting. At
the same time, it decreases the growth rate if the random variables ~ S are nondegenerate
(to ln < ln; cf. Proposition 2). Under aggregate uncertainty, the discount rate will
thus exceed the sum of the actual growth rate and the death rate associated with mean
survival.
Proof. Let ~ S(t) denote the common realization in period t of the random variables





































= ln   lnS + E ln ~ S: (10)
Since the fertilities (x1;:::;xT) appear only in ln, the arguments of Section 1.3 ensure
that evolution will select for marginal rates of substitution given by (9).20
Intuitively, shocks that are common across ages distort none of the intertemporal
trade-os captured by the marginal rate of substitution. The marginal rate of substitution
and hence the discount rate is then xed at the specication appropriate for the mean
Leslie matrix. Indeed, this discount rate could be obtained from a Leslie matrix with
no mortality at all, an observation used below. If the aggregate uncertainty is severe,
the growth rate  may fall well short of , giving us discounting at a rate signicantly
exceeding the the sum of the growth rate and the death rate associated with mean survival.
20Notice that, since E ~ S = S and hence E ln ~ S < lnS, we have ln < ln, in accordance with
Proposition 2.
18Hence, as long as our ancestral environment featured aggregate uncertainty, there is no
puzzle in our having evolved to have discount rates higher than can be justied on the
basis of the long-run average population growth rate and the death rate associated with
mean survival.
Gurven and Kaplan (2007, pp. 345{348) note that contemporary hunter-gatherer
groups often exhibit annual growth rates in excess of two percent, considerably higher
than the approximately zero growth rate that prevailed over the vast bulk of our evolution-
ary history. They suggest two explanations. First, contemporary hunter-gatherers may
not re
ect our evolutionary past. Second, population dynamics may exhibit a saw-tooth
pattern, with intermixed periods of relatively strong growth and occasional and perhaps
quite rapid population crashes, and with the former bound to be disproportionately rep-
resented among contemporary data. As long as the population crashes are evolutionarily
neutral, and so do not change the population age structure, this argument is formalized
and generalized by the model presented in this section. The rare and rapid population
crashes could keep long-term growth rates hovering near zero, while the marginal rate of
substitution would be adapted to the mean Leslie matrix.
To get an idea of the numbers involved, we need an idea of the upper bound on
human growth rate, i.e., an idea of how fast a population would grow in the absence of any
mortality. Suppose that individuals start reproducing at age 15 and stop at age 45, that
the probability of giving birth in a given year is 0:15, and that here is no death risk before
age 45. With the exception of the absence of death before the end of one's reproductive
age, these numbers are reasonably consistent with observations of contemporary hunter-
gatherers.21 We can ignore the risk of death on the strength of the previous observation
21Kim Hill and A. Magdalena Hurtado's (1996, Chapter 8, especially Table 8.3) study of the Ache
suggests a prime-age birth probability of 0:15 per year. (We cut the birth probabilities reported there in
half. The 0:15 then represents the probability of a female birth, providing a valid comparison with our
model of asexual reproduction.) Kendra McSweeney and Shahna Arps (2005, especially p. 14) survey
indigenous populations in lowland Latin America who are recovering from prior catastrophic declines
with rapid population growth. They nd total fertility rates (roughly, the number of children born to a
woman over the course of her child-bearing years) between 3.9 and 10.5, with a median of 7.9. A total
fertility rate of 9, somewhat near the upper end of this range, coupled with a thirty-year reproductive
19that an increased death risk would only prompt a compensating decrease in the growth
rate, leaving the discount rate unchanged. From (4), the implied dominant eigenvalue




 , which yields  = 1:05675 and hence a growth and
discount rate of ln = 0:055.
If this discount rate is the product of an evolutionary past featuring aggregate un-
certainty and a zero growth rate, then we must have, from (10),
0 = ln = ln   lnS + E ln ~ S = 0:055 + E ln ~ S;
where the second equality gives the realized growth rate as the dierence between the
discount rate (ln lnS) and expected log of the random survival probability. The nal
equality inserts our discount rate of 0:055. For simplicity, suppose that with probability
1   p we have an ordinary period in which the death rate is about two percent.22 With
probability p a catastrophe with a lower survival rate of Sy appears. Then we have
E ln ~ S = plnSy + (1   p)( 0:02) =  0:055 (recalling that  lnS is the death rate).
That is, we need catastrophes to appear with probability 0:25 if 85% of the population
survives; with probability 0:1 if 70% survive; with probability 0:05 if 50% survive; or
with probability 0:015 if only 10% survive.23 To further examine the eects of aggregate
uncertainty, consider this last possibility. Each agent faces a compound survival lottery
featuring a 10% chance of survival with probability 0:015 and a 98% chance of survival
with probability 0:985. The mean survival rate is thus 0:9668, with a corresponding
continuous death rate of 0:034. If all this risk were idiosyncratic, the population would
still grow at about two percent. It is the aggregate nature of the uncertainty that brings
the growth rate down another two percent, to zero.24
span (see McSweeney and Arps (2005, p. 15) and especially Hill and Hurtado (1996, Table 8.3)), gives a
yearly birth probability of 0.3. Halving this to account for our asexual model again gives us 0.15.
22Recall that Gurven and Kaplan (2007, pp. 330{3341) estimate that annual mortality rates ranged
from one percent for ten-year-olds to four percent for sixty-year-olds.
23Though direct evidence is scarce, it seems inevitable that the ice ages would have caused sharp drops
in primitive human population levels.
24In contrast, the catastrophic aggregate uncertainty we are discussing here makes little dierence if the
catastrophes are frequent and mild. Idiosyncratic survival lotteries featuring an 85% chance of survival
20These calculations bring us from the discount rates of a few percent implied by a
model with only idiosyncratic uncertainty to discount rates between ve and six percent.
This still does not bring us to the ten percent rates of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutstr om (2008). It is signicant here that estimates of the pure rate of time preference
derived from actual behavior are often lower than estimates derived from experimental
data, sometimes coming closer to our rough calculation of ve to six percent (e.g., Robert
H. Litzenberger and Cherukuri U. Rao (1971, Tables 1 and 2)).
Once again, we have a model with the rather counterfactual prediction that we should
observe only a single reproductive prole. As is the case under idiosyncratic uncertainty,
we can suppose that newborn agents are independently (across time and agents) assigned
a feasible set XT  <T
+ of possible reproductive proles from which they must choose.
An agent is again characterized by a vector of reproduction proles, one for each possible
feasible set, with this vector being heritable across generations. Evolution will select for
the vector of reproductive proles that gives the highest average growth rate, inducing a
variety of reproductive proles each of which would be consistent with preferences that
are described by (4) (applied to the appropriate feasible set in each case), with  now
being the average population growth rate.
2.5 Imperfectly correlated survival rates
We now turn to the case in which 
uctuations in the aggregate environment have po-
tentially dierent eects on the survival of dierent ages. In doing so, our attention
turns from the level to the pattern of discounting. Our general nding is that imper-
fectly correlated survival rates push marginal rates of substitution away from exponential
discounting. The nature of the departure from exponential discounting depends on the
precise nature of the aggregate uncertainty. We rst explore a plausible case that gives
rise to a present bias.
with probability 0:25 and a 98% chance of survival with probability 0:75 give a mean survival rate of
0:95, and hence a death and discount rate of 0:0543. That the rst state of this compound lottery is
aggregate has virtually no eect on discount rates.
21We model survival rates as being aected by relatively small age-specic perturba-
tions around an age-independent common shock. There are elements of preference and
constraint mixed in this choice. We are more convinced that our evolutionary environ-
ment exhibited signicant and correlated 
uctuations in death rates than we are that
these death rates exhibited any particular pattern across ages. We thus nd appealing
a model that incorporates both possibilities while emphasizing the former. In addition,
our focus on small age-specic perturbations allows us to use a convenient approximation
method as the basis for the analysis, while there are no general methods for examining
our questions in the presence of large age-specic perturbations.
As before, a random variable ~ S(t) is drawn in each period t, identically and inde-
pendently distributed over time, with support contained in (0;1) and with mean S. In
the proportion 1   " of the population, each individual then receives an idiosyncratic
draw giving survival with probability ~ S and death otherwise. In addition, random vari-
ables (^ S0;:::; ^ ST 1) are also drawn each period, again identically and independently dis-
tributed over time, with ~ S + ^ S having support contained in (0;1].25 For the remaining
" proportion of the population, each agent of age  then obtains an idiosyncratic draw
giving survival with probability ~ S + ^ S and death otherwise. The random variable ~ S(t) is
thus relevant for the entire population and is the counterpart of the common survival-rate

uctuations examined in Section 2.4. The random variables (^ S0;:::; ^ ST 1) overlay these
common shocks with age-specic survival-rate perturbations. The larger is ", the greater
is the variation across ages in the aggregate death rate. We consider the case of small
" and hence small age-specic aggregate shock. There is no restriction that the shock ~ S
common to all ages is small, and no restriction on the idiosyncratic uncertainty.
We nd that the discount rate is no longer constant over time. Given our restriction
of our analysis to small values of ", and hence small departures from common death-rate

uctuations, we can infer only that discount rates will depart slightly from constancy.
However, discount rates may well exhibit more pronounced variations when age-specic
25More precisely, the random variables ~ S(t) and ^ S(t0) for all t;t0 = 1;2;::: and  = 1;:::;T are
independent, except that the ^ S(t0) need not be independent across  for a given t0.
22survival rate 
uctuations are larger.
We now write the realized Leslie matrix for period t as
(11) ~ Z(t) = ~ X(t) + " ~ H(t);
where ~ X(t) is the commonly perturbed Leslie matrix as in (8), under the assumption that
the ~ S are identical, and ~ H(t) is the perturbation matrix
(12) ~ H(t) =
2
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6
4
x1 ^ S0(t) ^ S1(t) 0 ::: 0





xT 1 ^ S0(t) 0 0 ::: ^ ST 1(t)
xT ^ S0(t) 0 0 ::: 0
3
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Each of the random variables in the matrix ~ H(t) has a zero mean. Our analysis is
based on the following approximation (cf. S Tuljapurkar (1990, Chapter 12)):
Proposition 4 Suppose the matrices ~ H(t) in (11) are independent across periods and






0 ~ Z(1)::: ~ Z(t)v












Section 4.2 presents the proof.
The expression for the growth rate given by (13) contains some familiar terms. The
rst three terms give us the growth rate under purely common survival-rate perturbations
(cf. (10)). The term Ef(u0 ~ Hv)2g is the variance of the growth factor of total reproductive
value, evaluated in the long run using the population proportions u and reproductive
values v derived from the mean Leslie matrix. When perturbations to survival rates vary
by age, the growth rate is thus that which would prevail without such variation, minus a
\variance penalty."26
26Revisiting some previous points, it is immediate that Ef(u0 ~ Hv)2g  0, and hence that introducing
232.5.1 Marginal rates of substitution
When aggregate eects on survival vary across ages in a symmetric way, marginal rates
of substitution decline over time:
Proposition 5 Suppose the random variables (^ S0;::: ^ ST 1) share common variance V
and common covariance C of any pair. Then for suciently small ", the marginal rate








strictly so if x+1 > 0 and C < V .
The random shocks ^ S to the survival probabilities may range from being independent
across agents (C = 0) to being perfectly correlated (C = V ) (notice that, necessarily,
C  V ). As long as the aggregate shocks are not perfectly correlated across ages, marginal
rates of substitution are decreasing in , i.e., intertemporal preferences exhibit a present
bias.
The common-variance and common-covariance assumptions are sucient but not
necessary for this result. It is clear that this present bias will continue to obtain as
long as the distributions of the various aggregate shocks are not too dissimilar. Indeed,
the method of proof can be applied to ascertain the implications of any conguration of
distributions, though with possibly much more tedious calculations.
The most striking aspect of Proposition 5 is that a present bias emerges despite the
complete symmetry of the aggregate age-specic survival shocks. These aggregate shocks
have independent and identical distributions across periods, and within periods have iden-
tical (and possibly independent) distributions across ages, but still induce asymmetries
in discounting across ages. Alternative considerations that might lie behind nonexponen-
tial discounting, such as age-dependent idiosyncratic death rates or the time structure of
variation in the eects of aggregate uncertainty across ages cannot increase the population growth rate.
Independence across  of the ^ S(t) involved in the construction of ~ H is one formulation ensuring that
Ef(u0 ~ Hv)2g > 0 and hence that variation in aggregate uncertainty slows growth. In Example 1, we have
~ X(t) = X for all t, H(t) equals either X0 or X00, " = 1, E ln ~ S   lnS = 0 and Ef(u0Hv)2g = 0.
24the technology transforming consumption into fertility, rely on asymmetries across ages
for their eects. A new insight derived from the study of aggregate uncertainty is that
nonexponential discounting can arise in a setting devoid of temporal asymmetries.27
2.5.2 Why not exponential?
What lies behind these results? Suppose there is aggregate uncertainty only in one survival
rate S, so that survival from age  to  +1 is uncertain. For much the same reason that
aggregate uncertainty reduces the growth rate in a single-age population (cf. Section 2.1),
this reduces the value of period-0 births, for all 0 > . As a result, the discount rate
between periods  and  + 1 is increased, since it now takes more period- + 1 births
to counteract a given decrease in period- births. (Section 4.3 illustrates this claim.)
However, marginal rates of substitution between other adjacent periods are unaected.
The marginal rate of substitution thus falls as we move beyond period , introducing a
present bias. At the same time, the marginal rate of substitution between periods  and
 + 1 is now higher than the marginal rate of substitution in earlier periods, pushing
discounting away from a present bias. We must in general consider aggregate uncertainty
in more than one survival rate, leading to contending forces.
To strip away some of the complication, suppose that there are only three age classes
(T = 3) and that ~ S = S 2 (0;1) with probability one, so there is no common component
to the aggregate survival shocks. Then applying (13) and then (4), we can calculate
(Section 4.3 provides details),




















































where V is the variance of the aggregate shock to the period- survival rate. This ex-
27To be more precise, our age-specic aggregate shocks are \exchangeable" (cf. William Feller (1971,
pp. 228{230)). The terminal age T eectively builds aging into our model, but this is not the source
of the present bias, since the eect would still arise if we worked without such an upper bound and an
innite sequence of positive fertilities xt.
25pression immediately suggests that exponential discounting is not to be expected.28 The
important question is: Given V0 = V1 = V2 = V > 0, how do the contending forces
introduced by the aggregate shocks to the various survival rates combine to aect the
marginal rates of substitution  dx2=dx1 and  dx3=dx2?
To be more precise, let us further simply by (innocuously) assuming  = 1, giving










The growth rate ln depends on the various x in a number of implicit ways (e.g., through
v1). However, these implicit dependencies alone generate a constant discount rate. Depar-
tures from exponential discounting hinge on the explicit appearances of the x in (14).29
Taking the relevant derivatives and using the fact that the x enter terms of order "2
(i.e., ignoring higher-order terms in "), we nd that if the term in brackets in (15) were
linear, of the form 1+x2 +x3 +x3, then the eect of increasing x2 would be one half the
eect of increasing x3, which would in turn be consistent with exponential discounting




ecting its origin as a variance), the eect of increasing x2 > 0 is more than one
half the eect of increasing x3, causing the discount rate to fall as we move away from
the present.
2.6 Robustness
Our rst message was that aggregate uncertainty drives a wedge between discount rates
and the sum of the population growth and mortality rates. On top of this, we have now
seen that aggregate uncertainty can push discounting away from the exponential pattern
28The rst term in (14) gives the growth rate that would prevail without age-dependent mortality
perturbations. The fertilities x1, x2, and x3 appear here, with each x divided by  1. As we have
seen, these terms alone give us constant marginal rates of substitution (equalling ) and hence constant
discount rates. The nal term, arising out of the variance penalty, again includes the fertilities x1 x2 and
x3, but now divided by various powers of . Once we mix these powers with the regular relationship
between x and  1 of the initial term, we cannot expect constant marginal rates of substitution.
29Section 4.3 sketches a proof of these observations.
26of discounted expected utility. How robust is the result that discount rates are pushed in
the direction of a present bias?
The building block for our analysis, that age-specic aggregate uncertainty only in
the survival rate S increases the discount rate between periods  and  + 1, is quite
general. However, the combined eects of age-specic perturbations to multiple ages are
more fragile. Our present bias result rests on two assumptions, namely that perturbations
to survival rates that are not common across ages are relatively small and are symmetric
across ages. This strikes us as a natural setting, fueled by the belief that environmental

uctuations aecting survival rates are likely to be felt across all ages.
However, two examples illustrate how dierent specications can lead to dierent
results. Robson and Samuelson (forthcoming) present an example, with age-specic per-
turbations that are no by means small, in which the optimal discount rate between any
pair of ages is zero, no matter what the population growth rate and death rate.30 The
present section explores another departure from our maintained assumptions that leads
to a future bias, i.e., to marginal rates of substitution that increase as one moves away
from the present.
Suppose that newborns whose parents are of dierent ages have dierent infant
mortality rates. For example, older parents may be larger and better able to nourish
themselves, in turn allowing them to produce larger or better-nourished ospring (cf.
Charlesworth (1994, Chapter 5)). If these infant mortality rates were idiosyncratic, there
would be no diculty in simply folding them into the values x, with no other change in
the analysis. However, the case that these newborn survival rates are subject to aggregate
uncertainty requires a new analysis.
To isolate the eects of this uncertainty, we assume that ~ S(t) is degenerate, that there
is no aggregate randomness in other survival rates, and that parent age has no impact
lasting beyond infant mortality. We can again write the realized Leslie matrix for period
t as in (11), with ~ X(t) given by X from (7) for each t and with the perturbation matrix
30The discount rate is thus constant across ages in this example, but its magnitude is nonetheless
surprising.
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x1^ S1(t) 0 0 ::: 0





xT 1^ ST 1(t) 0 0 ::: 0
xT^ ST(t) 0 0 ::: 0
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where each of the random variables S in the matrix ~ H(t) again has a zero mean. We
have:31
Proposition 6 Let x1 = x2 = ::: = xT  x. Let (^ S1(t);:::;^ ST(t)) share common
variance V and common covariances C. Then for small ", the marginal rate of substitution








strictly so if  6= 1 and C < V .
Though we nd the model of age-specic aggregate survival rates of Section 2.5.1 the
most natural of those we have considered, it is clear that the present bias of Proposition
5 is not universal. Notice, however, that here again we have agents who are pushed
away from exponential discounting despite aggregate shocks that are symmetric across
ages|the aggregate shocks of Proposition 6 have independent and identical distributions
across periods, and within period have identical (and possibly independent) distributions
across parental ages. Our robust nding is thus that aggregate uncertainty per se can
push preferences away from exponential discounting, with the nature of the departure|
whether present bias, future bias, or possibly something more complicated|depending
upon details of the aggregate uncertainty.
31This result examines a symmetric setting in which x1 = x2 = ::: = xT  x. When uncertainty is
idiosyncratic, the marginal rate of substitution between x and x0 is independent of the levels of x and
x0 (cf. (5)), but this need no longer be the case with aggregate uncertainty. Setting x1 = x2 = ::: =
xT  x is the obvious way to isolate systematic preferences over timing.
283 Discussion
Present bias. We have found that evolutionarily-induced intertemporal preferences
may exhibit a present bias. However, the preferences in our model do not generate
preference reversals. The marginal rate of substitution between x+1 and x may decline
in , but this decline is linked to age and not to time relative to the present. A trade-o
between x9 and x10 that confers evolutionary advantages when made at age 1 will still
confer such advantages when made at age 5 or at age 9. A 1-period-old will accordingly
make intertemporal choices that cannot be rationalized by exponential discounting, but
will not reverse those choices later.
We are not disappointed that the model does not generate preference reversals. We
think present bias may well be a more basic phenomenon than preference reversals, and
it seems more readily generated by evolutionary optimization.32 More importantly, our
analysis suggests that we can expect discount rates to vary systematically with age, ad-
dressing intertemporal choices over longer spans of time than those typically covered in
preference-reversal experiments. In contrast to most models of age-dependent discount-
ing, these variations do not re
ect changes in the death rate. Hence, a present bias arising
out of aggregate uncertainty could oset increasing impatience arising out of increased
mortality, thus providing a possible explanation for the surprising patience of older indi-
viduals found in some studies. David M. Bishai (2004), for example, nds evidence from
wage dierentials that the rate of time preference declines with age.33
Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) and Sozou (1998) also present evolutionary models
leading to a present bias in discounting, including in Dasgupta and Maskin's case the
prospect of preference reversals. The force driving discounting in both models is the
prospect that an opportunity for future consumption may disappear before it can be re-
32Simply because it is inconsistent with exponential discounting, present bias per se is sometimes
considered anomalous (as in Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002) and Richard H. Thaler
(1981)). More typically, it is assumed that a present bias must imply preference reversals.
33Eric Bettinger and Robert Slonim (2007) provide complementary evidence on the impatience of
children. Declining impatience among children could re
ect decreasing mortality, but this factor alone
would imply rising impatience among adults.
29alized. A source of future food may be seized by a hungry rival or access blocked by a
predator.34 We have no doubt that uncertainty is an important element of intertemporal
decision making, but have two compelling reasons for not proceeding in a similar fash-
ion. First, these models assume that the basic evolutionary goal is to maximize total
undiscounted consumption. In contrast, we derive the appropriate basic goal from a more
primitive analysis of population growth rates. Indeed, our analysis suggests that future
consumption will be discounted even if there is no uncertainty at all. Second, we wish to
maintain the conventional dividing line between our preferences and the feasible sets over
which these preferences are dened. Dasgupta and Maskin suppose, on the other hand,
that evolutionarily important feasibility considerations were built into our preferences, so
that contemporary choices between goods are evaluated as if they are choices between
their uncertainty-adjusted evolutionary equivalents. Evolution may have have endowed
us with such preferences, but it is important to check whether such a hypothesis is nec-
essary in explaining our intertemporal behavior. Our inclination is accordingly to begin
by examining discounting over consumption opportunities that are not subject to risk,
allowing us to isolate rates of time preference.
Generalizations. Our analysis is based on an age-independent mortality rate. How-
ever, we would expect mortality to vary systematically over one's life span, especially near
the beginning and end. We would then expect these variations to induce age-dependent
discount-rate patterns beyond those appearing in our constant-death-rate model, tending
to increase discounting among young children|who act as if there is no tomorrow|and
34Discounting is then pushed toward a present bias by the prospect of learning about the hazard rate at
which the consumption opportunity disappears (in Sozou (1998)) or by the prospect that the consumption
opportunity may arrive early (in Dasgupta and Maskin (2005)). Karl W arneryd (2007) presents an
alternative model of presently-biased discounting based on intergenerational transfers, noting that with
sexual reproduction one typically expects a child to carry a copy of one's genes with probability 1
2 and a
grandchild to do so with probability 1
4, and that a tendency to select mates from somewhat interrelated
groups can push this exponential sequence toward a present bias.
30the elderly, re
ecting then the typical human U-shaped mortality pattern.35
Our analysis provides the basic tools for examining age-dependent survival rates.
Suppose that a life history now consists of a prole (x1;:::;xT) of expected ospring and
a prole (S0;:::;ST 1) of survival probabilities. Then, analogous to (4), the dominant














Notice rst that taking S0
 = S for all  and x0
 = S S0S1 S 1x for any S 2 (0;1)
gives an equivalent system with an identical growth rate. As a result, we come immediately
to Section 1.1's observation that any analysis in which idiosyncratic survival rates vary
by age can be translated into an equivalent analysis with identical survival rates. Next,








This gives us the expected result that marginal rates of substitution will be higher when
survival rates are lower. Turning to the case of aggregate uncertainty, we can think of
the survival rates in (8) as being given by products S ~ S(t), allowing us to reformulate
and extend Propositions 1{4 to a combination of arbitrary age-dependent idiosyncratic
shocks with multiplicative aggregate shocks. There is thus considerable scope for pushing
our model beyond its current focus to capture other considerations.
Implications. If our evolutionary model of discounting is on the right track, what sorts
of behavior should we expect to see? First, we should not be surprised if discount rates
exceed the sum of growth rates and death rates, with the gap being larger the more
important was aggregate uncertainty in our evolutionary environment. In addition, we
should not be surprised if discount rates are not constant. We have considered only small
variations in survival rates across ages, giving rise to concomitantly small departures from
35At the same time, intergenerational transfers may well blunt the increases in discounting that would
otherwise appear once one passes reproductive age, by allowing indirect ways of enhancing eective
reproduction by pushing resources into the future.
31exponential discounting. Larger variations in death rates across ages might well rise to
larger eects on discount rates.
Next, the role of mortality risk, long considered central in discounting, is more subtle
than it rst appears. Dierent populations that have equivalent fertility patterns and
dierent death rates may well nonetheless exhibit identical discount factors. In our sim-
ple model, with arbitrary patterns of idiosyncratic uncertainty and uniform aggregate
mortality shocks, any change in the death rate is matched by a corresponding change in
the growth rate, leaving discount rates untouched. However, variations in death rates
across agents within a given population, and hence within agents whose discount rates
are shaped by the same population growth rate, should be directly re
ected in discount
rates.36
Perhaps most importantly, our analysis provides yet another indication that idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate uncertainty can have quite dierent eects, and hence may enter our
preferences quite dierently. A standard nding in psychological studies of risk attitudes
is that a feeling of control is important if inducing people to be comfortable with risk.37
Risks arising out of situations in which people feel themselves unable to aect the outcome
cause considerably more apprehension than risks arising out of circumstances people per-
ceive themselves to control. Why might this be the case? The rst task facing evolution
in an attempt to induce dierent behavior in the face of idiosyncratic and aggregate risks
is to give us a way of recognizing these risks. \Control" may be a convenient stand-in for
an idiosyncratic risk. If so, then our seemingly irrational fear of uncontrolled risk may be
a mechanism inducing an evolutionarily rational fear of aggregate risk.
36Margo Wilson and Martin Daly (1997) report that women in Chicago neighborhoods with higher
mortality rates tend to reproduce earlier, consistent with the higher discount rates that such mortality
rates may induce.
37See Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischho and Sarah Lichtenstein (1982) for an early contribution to this
literature and Slovic (2000) for a more recent introduction.
324 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Let X be the mean Leslie matrix and let N(t) be the associated population process. Let
~ X(t) be the period-t matrix under aggregate uncertainty, drawn independently across
periods and satisfying  1 < E lnu0 ~ Xv < 1, with
Ef ~ X(t)g = X:
Let ~ N0(t) be a random vector describing the size of each age class in the population at time
t under aggregate uncertainty and N0(t) its counterpart under the mean Leslie matrix X.
Our rst observation is that
Ef ~ N(t)g = N(t):
To see this, notice rst that we have
Ef ~ N
0(1)g = EfN
0(0) ~ X(1)g = N
0(0)X = N
0(1);
with the penultimate inequality following from the fact that each element of X is the
expected value of the corresponding element in ~ X. Now we construct an argument by
induction. Suppose EfN0(0) ~ X(1) ~ X(t   1)g = N0(0)Xt 1. Then
Ef ~ N
0(t)g = EfN
0(0) ~ X(1) ~ X(t)g = EfN
0(0)X




where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that every
random variable in the period-t Leslie matrix ~ X is independent of the random variable in
the Leslie matrices for periods 1;:::;t   1, and the next equality again follows from the
fact that each term in X is the expected value of the corresponding term in ~ X.
This gives Ef ~ N(t)g = N(t) and hence Ef ~ N0(t)vg = N0(t)v, where v is the right
eigenvector of X. We can then apply Jensen's inequality to show that this expectation











33The inequality is strict if the distribution of ~ N(t) is nondegenerate.38 The argument is
completed by noting that the long-run average growth rate under the mean matrix is
limt!1
lnN0(t)v




E ln ~ N0(t)v
t (cf. Patrick Billingsley (1986, Theorem 25.12,
p. 348)).
4.2 Proof of Proposition 4

















0 ~ Z(1)::: ~ Z(t)v
i
 (")
is jointly analytic in the matrix elements and the perturbation parameter ".39
Taylor's theorem allows us to write












for some "0 2 [0;"]. Dene now the analytic function
F(t;") = E ln
h
u
































38Example 1 shows that weak equality can obtain if the that dierent realizations of ~ X have dierent
identical eigenvectors and dierent eigenvalues.
39The rst inequality, which holds almost surely, follows from Billingsley (1986, Theorem 25.12, p.
348). Analyticity is shown by David Ruelle (1979, Theorem 3.1). Note that our assumptions imply there
is an integer k > 0 such that any k-fold product of realized Leslie matrices is strictly positive. We can
then represent our population process as an innite product of randomly chosen strictly positive k-fold
products of Leslie matrices. Taking C (in Ruelle's notation) to be the nonnegative orthant then ensures
that Ruelle's sucient condition is satised (Ruelle (1979, p. 69).
34The second inequality follows from the analyticity of F(t;") and ("), which implies any
that derivative of 1
tF(t;") converges to the corresponding derivative of (").40





















v is given by
u












which is in turn the product of t matrices, the ith of which is the perturbation matrix
~ H(i), and the remainder of which are realized Leslie matrices of the form ~ X(j) + " ~ H(j)


































Then, using the facts that u0X = u0, Xv = v, E ~ H(t) = 0, and that ~ X(i) and X
dier in that the former involves the realized survival rate ~ S(i) and the latter the mean
survival rate S, we have
1
t


















40See Nelson Dunford and Jacob T. Schwartz (1988, p. 228). Note that any real analytic function
can be extended on a neighborhood to a complex analytic function. This result provides an independent
proof that  is analytic.
35for all t, and hence in the limit as t gets arbitrarily large.
Substituting into our Taylor expansion of ("), we have













4.3 Variances and (Non)Exponential Discounting
Set T = 3 and let ~ S = S 2 (0;1) with probability one, so there is no common component to
the aggregate shocks to survival. Assume also that the age-dependent aggregate shocks are
contemporaneously independent with variances V0; V1; and V2. The variance component
f(u0 ~ Hv)g in (13) is then41
u





^ S0x1 ^ S1 0
^ S0x2 0 ^ S2



















ux ^ S0 + v2u1 ^ S1 + v3u2 ^ S2
= v1u1^ S0 + v2u1 ^ S1 + v3u2 ^ S2:
Squaring and taking the expectation, using the independence of the aggregate shocks













































41The last equality uses (4) and u = u+1.
42The second equality uses u = u+1.
43For example, 2-period-olds produce a total of x2 1-period-olds one period later (worth v1=), and x3


























and the long run growth rate is given by the following expression (using (13) and the
degeneracy of ~ S, and ignoring the O(") error term)






























In order to nd complete expressions for the derivatives of  with respect to x1 x2 and x3,
we must account for the dependence of the endogenous variables , u1, and v1 on x1 x2
and x3. However, upon taking the derivatives, we nd that only the explicit dependence
of  on x2 and x3 introduces a distortion away from exponential discounting.
Letting  = 1 is innocuous and simplies the notation. Now, if only ^ S2 were nonde-
generate, we would have
















=  = 1;
so that the rate of discount increases on this account alone. Alternatively, if only ^ S1 were
nondegenerate, we would have









depressing the partial derivatives with respect to both x2 and x3: This increases  
dx2
dx1 but
can be shown to leave  
dx3
dx2 constant. That is,







In the case that V0 = V1 = V2 = V , we have



















37Using the fact that the explicit dependence of  on x2 and x3 aects only the term of













1 + (x2 + x3)
2 + (x3)
2
From (19), this condition is equivalent to v2 > v3, which holds as long as x2 > 0 (and
thus the condition x+1 > 0 in the statement of Proposition 5). Hence, when  = 1, the
presence of a present bias is equivalent to the condition that reproductive values decline
with age. This decline in turn re
ects the fertility x2 available to a two-period-old agent
that is lost to a three-period-old agent. An analogous but slightly more complex argument
yields the same unambiguous result when  6= 1.
4.4 Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
We begin with a general structure that provides the foundation for the proof of Proposi-
tions 5 and 6. Let the perturbation matrix H(t) be given by
2
6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
x1^ S1(t) ^ S1 0 ::: 0





xT 1^ ST 1(t) 0 0 ::: ^ ST 1
xT^ ST(t) 0 0 ::: 0
3
7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7
5
:
The random variables ~ S(t), ^ S0(t0) and ^ S00(t00) are all independent, except that ^ S(t),
^ S0(t), ^ S00(t) and ^ S000(t) need not be independent for a given t. Let C0 denote the
contemporaneous covariance between ^ S and ^ S0, let C0 denote the contemporaneous
covariance between ^ S and ^ S0, and let C0 denote the contemporaneous covariance be-
tween ^ S and ^ S0. To make the notation more compact, let
x^ S  ^ Z
^ S = ^ Z:
Expanding on our previous notation, let (x;") = limt!1
1
t lnu0Z(1):::Z(t)v. From
38Proposition 4, we can write





Since (x;") is analytic in (x;") it follows readily that the Taylor series for d=dx(x;")













This allows us to examine marginal rates of substitution by examining derivatives, with
respect to the x, of the second-order Taylor expansion of (x;").
Expanding (13), we have












































































4.4.1 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of Proposition 6 is notationally less involved, and so we present this argument
rst. From (20), we have






































39where the nal equality uses the fact that
u1 =
T 1
T 1 + ::: +  + 1
u2 =
T 2




T 1 + ::: +  + 1


















































































=2(   1)xT  :



























and v0u = 1.44 Hence, v1 depends both on  and (x1;:::;xT). We can calculate:
44The expressions for v2;:::;vT in terms of v1 follow from the fact that v is a right eigenvector of the

















































































































T  + "2(   1)T    "2
K + O("3)
T  1 + "2T  1   "2
K+1 + O("3)
: (25)








which can be veried by a straightforward but tedious calculation (details available in the
technical appendix).
414.4.2 Proof of Proposition 5
From (20), using (23){(24), we now have (hereafter omitting the O("3) term)










































We conserve on notation by letting K denote the term in square brackets and hence
writing  as











The derivation of decreasing marginal rates of substitution then follows lines similar to
the proof of Proposition 6, revolving around a straightforward but tedious calculation and
comparisons of the derivatives of , presented in the technical appendix.
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46THE EVOLUTION OF TIME PREFERENCE
WITH AGGREGATE UNCERTAINTY
Technical Appendix: Details of Proofs
Not for publication
Equation numbers such as (17) refer to equations in the paper, while (A1) denotes
an equation in the technical appendix.
Proof of Proposition 6
We begin the argument with equations (25){(26) of the paper. These indicate that we













T  + 2(   1)T    2
K + O(3)
T  1 + 2T  1   2
K+1 + O(3)
<
T  1 + 2T  1   2
K+1 + O(3)






























The terms involving  cancel one another. Then dividing by  2





45Cross multiplication gives identical terms of order 0 on both sides. The next largest terms, of order
2, are collected below.
























Recalling our assumption that each covariance is equal to C and each variance equal to
V , we see that the terms in the summation corresponding to values of j other than ,





















Multiplying by 4, this is equivalent to
2C + V + 
2V > 
2C + C + 2V
or
V (   1)
2 > C(   1)
2;
and so the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5
We begin with equation (28) of the paper, giving











Then, analogously to (22) of the paper, we are interested in derivatives of the form (where


























2Then following the reasoning that took us from steps (22) of the paper to (A3), we have



























































































































where the rst equality collects like terms and the second uses (27) to take derivatives of
ki. Inserting in (A4)we then have increasing impatience if
46At this point, we simply write dK=dx rather than taking the derivative explicitly; the corresponding
derivative in moving from (20) to (A3) is 2
PT
j=1 2T  jxjCj, the notation for which we subsequently
simplify by letting K  2
PT













































































It is then helpful to tackle this inequality in parts. We begin with the rst and fth terms
on the left, and the rst on the right. These are precisely the terms that entered the
calculations in proving Proposition 6, leading to increasing impatience. In this case, given
our assumption that the random variables ^ Z, for  = 1;:::;T, are perfectly correlated,
these terms cancel.





































































































which follows from C < V given x+1 > 0.





























However, each of the terms C0 represents the common covariance C between one of the
random variables ^ Z1;:::; ^ Z 1 and the ^ Z0. Hence, this equality holds.
Finally, we work on the fourth and eighth terms on the left, and the fourth term on











































5Once again, each of the terms C0 represents the common covariance C between one of
the random variables ^ Z1;:::; ^ Z 1 and the ^ Z0. These terms are thus constant in j, and
hence the equality can be veried by simply counting the number of terms on each side.
The desired result (A4) then follows from (A5).
6